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Contract law in the United States of America is in a state of flux. 
The old common law model of contracts, deemed dead by 
Professor Grant Gilmore as long ago as 19741, lives on but struggles 
to find a comfortable re-invention.  The conversion from a paper to 
a digital universe, the change in the nature of most contracts and 
the evolution of legal scholarship are disruptive factors.  But the 
trouble runs even deeper. Is it time to rethink contract law entirely? 
So long as individuals wish to bind themselves to agreements 
enforceable by the state there will be contracts. The question may 
be how to think of contracts coherently. To this end, this essay 
looks at a book that holds some answers. 
                                                          
 Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School, Boalt Hall, 
University of California. 
1  („THE DEATH OF CONTRACT‟ authored by Prof. Grant Gilmore, published 
in 1995 by the Ohio State University Press spawned much discussion 
and criticism. The fact that it still causes controversy is a testament to the 
power of its insights.) 
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Boilerplate  
In 2013 Professor Margaret Radin published Boilerplate,2 a 
monograph in which she explores the heart of contract law in the 
United States in the 21st century. The book has earned prestigious 
recognition but has also drawn potent criticism. As one who has 
taught contract law to generations of law students at Berkeley Law 
School, Boalt Hall, both the praise and the attacks make sense to 
me.  Though I align myself with those who praise the work, 
objections raised by its critics are not trivial. Radin paints with a 
broad brush when explicating doctrinal matters. The prescriptive 
last part of the book does not hold out a solution that is either 
easily embraced or conceivably implemented. Objections aside, 
there is much to be said about the book. This essay will focus on the 
two elements that are most cogent. The first is the model for 
understanding contracts that is presented. The second is Radin‟s 
reflection on the nature on contract theory in the United States. The 
two points are intimately intertwined but are profitably explored 
separately. 
The Model of Contracts 
In her book, Professor Radin calls for a reconsideration of the 
nature of contract law. She contends that the intellectual 
architecture of contract theory is no longer relevant to reality. As a 
senior scholar with an impressive list of achievements, Professor 
Radin is well-positioned to offer a penetrating critique and a new 
definition to the contractual relationship. To accomplish this task, 
Professor Radin sets out two models of framing contract law. The 
assumptions made about the basic building blocks of contract law 
are delineated and questioned in her tightly presented analysis. 
These two models of contract are built on two different sets of 
assumptions.  The models might live in the same theoretical world, 
but they cannot be explained by the same old theories.   
                                                          
2  MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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World A 
 In World A, a contract is conceived as an arm‟s length transaction 
between parties of relatively equal strength. The parties are not 
necessarily equal in intelligence or bargaining skill but as 
competent adults each party to a transaction possesses individual 
autonomy that allows him to make choices. The choices are his 
own. Independent of government or the interference of those who 
present themselves as knowing better, a person creates his own 
world of contract. Even bad choices must be supported if the 
system is to function. From this context the full range of contract 
theory is cast. The competence of the parties to make a contract is 
based on said party‟s possession of the mental ability of a normal 
human actor. Once a person is of age and mentally fit, that person 
can enter into contracts. He is autonomous, fully able to make 
decisions, good or bad, and to be responsible for the consequences 
of his actions. This autonomous adult is at the center of much 
common law theory. 
In World A, contractual questions of offer and acceptance are 
judged according to standards set in a context where the parties to 
the contract looked one another in the eye. The result was 
something on a very human scake. Skill and preparation were 
rewarded.  Free autonomous individuals made choices based on 
self perception of advantage. Although some participants 
prospered and some did not, but the scale of actions, the avenues of 
reasoning, were intuitive. Bargaining between individuals can be 
found among even infants.   
This conception of the transaction is crucial to theories of consent, 
liability and the full range of the theories of autonomy and free 
choice. It is permissible for the legal system to refuse to judge the 
adequacy of consideration if the parties are competent and thus are 
able to judge for themselves the desirability of an exchange. In 
World A it is logical to hold a contracting party to executory and 
even consequential damages. After all, the party was on notice to 
look out for himself when entering into the contract. In Model A, 
assigning responsibility for actions taken to the party who takes 
them is logical. One may dispute the theory, but it has coherence 
and power. 
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The Common Law origins of World A are grounded in the 
historical experience of centuries past. The English Common Law is 
the foundation upon which much of the legal architecture of 
thought in the United States is built. U.S. law students still read 
British judicial decisions as part of the required first year 
curriculum in Contracts, Property and Torts.3 The framing and 
characterization of legal categories are still rooted in the Common 
Law.   
Contract law is even more complex.  In the United States, contract 
law is subject to the dictates of federalism. At a law school like 
Berkeley, the general theory of contracts is taught. By contrast, 
practicing lawyers work in a world largely governed by state law. 
The lower federal courts play a role via cases that qualify for 
diversity jurisdiction, but even these decisions are invariably 
applying state law. Ergo contract Law is actually different in each 
state. Yet those who teach contracts at most law schools use one of 
a handful of popular texts on Contract Law.  This group of 
casebooks are broadly gauged, looks at general principles. The 
books present the law‟s dilemmas, not the law‟s solution. 
Instructing the lawyers of the future in general theories of law 
rather than in practical skill is counter-intuitive. Yet the practice 
dominates academia.  The accepted wisdom in the United States is 
that the more prestigious the law school, the more abstract the 
curriculum will be. Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Berkeley and peer 
institutions do not train practicing lawyers, they train judges and 
law professors.   
To assist in understanding Contract doctrine, the professor of 
contracts can point to the Restatement of Contracts, 2nd Edition. The 
American Law Institute (ALI), a blue-ribbon association of the 
United States leading judges, academics and practitioners the 
Restatement. It is an attempt to set out a logical statement of the 
best principles to be found in the decisions of the courts.  It is a 
purified common law. Though it is a magnificent tool, it is not 
enacted by any legislature or the precedent of any court. It is 
                                                          
3  (In the fall semester of 2014 students in the Contracts class that I teach 
reads, among many others, the decisions in  Raffles v. Wickelhaus, 2 H 
&C 906 (1864), 159 Eng. Rep. 373 and Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 
Eng. Rep. 145 (Court of Exchequer)). 
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internally inconsistent in places. It is a marvelous intellectual 
jumping off point, but it is neither primary authority nor always 
right. The Uniform Commercial Code, which was also written by 
the ALI, this time in tandem with the then National Conference of 
Commissioners on State laws, offers a legislative solution. A group 
of zealots who believed in systematizing and rationalizing the law 
of commercial contracts produced the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).   
The UCC is a progressive and functional form of contractual 
behavior, has been adopted in some form by each of the fifty states 
in the United States. According to the plan, members of the 
American Law Institute and the then National Conference of 
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,4 carried the UCC to each 
state legislature.  Powerful lobbying efforts were made. In the end, 
each state adopted the UCC as positive law for its own jurisdiction. 
Because the UCC had to be enacted by each state, through the office 
of its own legislature, amendments were made, format was 
converted, but in large part the UCC became ubiquitous. The courts 
of each state interpret the provisions of the UCC as they choose. 
Some of the most challenging sections of the Code are interpreted 
quite differently from one state to the other. But the gravitational 
power of the UCC is what counts the most. 
In the resultant World A, incremental changes may be made by the 
courts, amendments may be made by legislative bodies, but the old 
system moves forward in a coherent and intuitively justifiable 
manner. The Restatement of Contracts, 2nd Edition and the UCC 
work with other state legislation to chart the way for autonomous 
individuals to create contracts in World A. 
World B 
In World B, Professor Radin presents a vision of the world of 
contract as it stands in the early decades of the 21st century. No 
longer is the iconic contract one between two competent parties 
that is negotiated from scratch. In this World, only one party is a 
                                                          
4  David Frisch, Commercial Law's Complexity 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 245 (2011) (The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws changed its 
name to the more salubrious Uniform Law Commission (ULC) in 2007). 
Christ University Law Journal                                                   ISSN 2278-4322 
130 
 
human being. The other side is a corporate entity. There is no real 
negotiation over terms. The offeree is presented with a pre-drafted 
form. The form is no longer the final step in a negotiation between 
the parties, it is a take it or leave it offer. A purchaser may be able 
to fill in a few blanks but the great superstructure of the contract is 
predetermined, drawn up by the vendor. The contract will contain 
a large section of “boilerplate.” Boilerplate stands for the litany of 
provisions that travel with many contracts in World A. These are 
the terms that fill out the contract. Typically there are many terms, 
they may stretch over many pages. It is acknowledged by the 
courts that one does not normally read them.  One is signing not 
after considered bargaining. One is just signing. Boilerplate terms 
cover a wide range of issues but largely set out protections for the 
vendor.   
A boilerplate term can have a life of its own. For example, an 
integration or a merger clause, is designed to give notice that all 
elements of the contract are contained within the signed writing 
and that no extrinsic or parol evidence may be introduced to vary 
the written terms. This reification of the old „four corners‟ rule 
offers clarification and re-enforcement of the sanctity of the written 
document. As years passed, the merger clause became part of the 
boilerplate. No longer an element present in negotiation, it became 
part of a great corpus of boilerplate terms that are incorporated into 
most contracts automatically. Thus what had once been a choice 
has now become mere context. Radin is troubled that there is no 
true consent to such terms. The theory of consent, (i.e. that the 
independent parties express autonomous judgment designed to 
further best interests) fades away.  Indeed the terms are not 
designed to be read or consented to by anyone. Boilerplate takes on 
a life of its own. These take it or leave it forms are adhesion 
contracts when signed by consumers.  The great professor Friedrich 
Kessler has taught us that there is nothing inherently troublesome 
about the use of adhesion contracts.5  Modern life demands them. 
But Professor Kessler wrote this eighty years ago from the 
perspective of World A. 
                                                          
5  Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of 
Contract 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
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Professor Radin‟s book creates a place far from World A. In World 
B the consumer operates in a territory where the boundaries are set 
out by the terms that are never read. There is nothing startlingly 
new about this kind of contract. Karl Llewellyn once explained 
adhesion contracts by analogizing the signing of a form contract to 
the act of putting one‟s head in the mouth of a lion. As Llewellyn 
observed, one can only hope that it is a friendly lion.6 In fairness, 
Llewellyn recognized the functional advantages of adhesion 
contracts, but he had reservations. Professor Llewellyn also lived 
before computer screens that urged us to scroll down and check the 
“I have read and approved these terms” box.  Llewellyn may have 
suspected that most of us would scroll down as fast as possible to 
check the box though. He had a good feel for human frailty. 
Professor Radin takes two judicial opinions to task for the advance 
of World B. One is the Supreme Court of the United States opinion 
in Carnival Cruise Lines7. In this decision the Court held a party who 
had purchased a ticket for a cruise to have consented to boilerplate 
terms printed on the reverse side of the ticket despite the fact that 
the party had only received the ticket as he boarded the ship, that 
he possessed no actual knowledge of it and hence no meaningful 
assent. In the boilerplate was a forum selection clause that made 
life much more challenging for the plaintiff. This decision annually 
drives my students to distraction. The fact that the purchaser had 
no real understanding of what was signed, indeed under these facts 
had little opportunity to read the terms had he wished to do so, 
rankles. Some point out that even he been given a chance to read 
the boilerplate he may well not have understood what the clauses 
meant. 
Because most contract law in the United States is a matter for state 
courts and legislatures, the Supreme Court of the U.S. makes 
limited pronouncements on contract law. Thus Carnival Cruise 
                                                          
6  KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
362-371 (1960) (“. [t]he one party lays head into the mouth of the lion 
either-or mostly-without reading the fine print, or occasionally in hope 
and expectation, (not infrequently solid) that it will be a kind and gently 
lion.”). 
7  Carnival Cruise v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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stands as a lonesome monument but one that has haunted those 
concerned with the principle of consent. 
The second case is ProCD v Zeidenberg.8  This opinion from the 
Third Circuit of the United States, authored by Judge Easterbrook. 
Written in the mid 1990s this decision resolved the then vibrant 
issue of shrinkwrap contracts. The ProCD decision is an example of 
a brilliant judge, using the traditional tools of contract analysis, to 
deal with a problem which had not been part of the world in which 
said traditional tools were developed. Shrinkwrap contracts date 
from the days when most of the software was sold in boxes. The 
boxes contained compact disks which could then be loaded into 
one‟s computer. The boxes were sold in retail stores in those days, 
and vendors printed the contract of sale on the transparent 
wrapping of the box. If one opened the box, one accepted the terms. 
But as contracts grew more and more complex, they could not 
feasibly print on the wrapper of the box. Vendors thus began of 
print „Terms Inside‟ on the box. Only after purchasing the box and 
opening it, one found out the terms. Judge Easterbrook reasoned 
that so long as the purchaser was afforded a chance to return the 
box for a full refund after reading the terms, the contract was valid. 
This jumbling of the time line of contract analysis, moving the point 
at which the contract becomes valid away from the point of 
purchase into a process that proceeds in stages, was a major 
development. „Deal now terms later‟, also known as rolling 
contracts, called for intellectual gymnastics. Judge Easterbrook was 
up to the challenge. 
Though numerous commentators have raised pointed objections to 
ProCD, it remains the law. The Supreme Court has said nothing on 
the matter, and Judge Easterbrook is such brilliant and careful 
thinker that no subsequent decision has altered it. Judge 
Easterbrook elaborated on the idea in Hill v. Gateway9, a decision 
that clarified that the rolling contract‟s heart was time to reject. 
Though shrink wrap boxes are shining artifacts of the past, this 
opinion holds its ground as authority. Though subsequent cases 
have assailed it and some academics loathe it, no one has worked 
                                                          
8  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th cir. 1996). 
9  Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (2000). 
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out a way to dislodge it. Nor has the Supreme Court of the United 
States shown interest in examining the issue. 
A Quick Course in Contract Theory 
Boilerplate provides a bonus to the reader.  Professor Radin, a 
respected senior scholar, lays out the state of contract theory in the 
United States in 2013. Her summary is enormously helpful.  Any 
such summary runs serious risks. There is no way that something 
so general and approachable as an overview of a major theoretical 
error will not be subject to criticism. Any definitive pronouncement 
on a general theoretical legal topic is doomed to controversy. (I 
hesitate to imagine what would result if the faculty at Berkeley Law 
School was compelled to agree on what „law‟ is, or perhaps a 
definition of Freedom of Speech). Law professors are contrarians 
from the womb. Ergo Professor Radin shows bravery in her 
attempt.  Miraculously, however, she is quite successful. 
The point of the enterprise is that none of the reigning theories of 
contract law in the United States incorporate consideration of 
boilerplate. Her trenchant criticism is powerful. For purposes of my 
students, or for anyone who wishes to delve into the internal 
machinery of contract theory, the framing of the question is what 
matters. Here is a workable, perceptive summary of how scholars 
and jurists think about the contract theory. 
Professor Radin sets out four theoretic pathways to follow: 
autonomy theory, welfare theory, reliance theory and Aristotelian 
theory. This section of the book is one of the most useful for the 
reader.  Professor Radin offers an informed and clear description of 
the battles that currently rage in the realm of contract theory in the 
United States. Only a scholar of her eminence and senior status 
could succeed in such an endeavor. Remaining above the fray and 
setting out the parameters of the contested areas of theory calls for 
knowledge, judgment and experience.  Modern contract theory is 
in transition. It has always been characterized by a mixture of ideas 
but the old compromises show stress. 
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Autonomy Theory 
Autonomy theory provides the foundation for the World A. 
Grounded in liberal theory and entwined with laissez faire 
economics, autonomy theory privileges voluntary action and 
individual dignity. Radin does a masterful job of working through 
the spectrum from promises to contract in World A.  
Exploring ideas grounded in the work of Hegel and Kant, working 
all the way to Professor Charles Fried‟s work on promises, Radin 
sketches autonomy theory from a myriad of angles. Introducing the 
work of Professor Benson on unconscionability in contract law 
completes the project. 
Autonomy Theory is frequently discussed in tandem with moral 
theory or the jurisprudence of natural law. American law has 
stepped away from claiming a distinctly moral basis that is 
separate from the legal edifice. The legal system of the United 
States abjures morality in favor of a system based on structure and 
fairness. Drawing out the stress lines in examining these ideas is 
one of Professor Radin‟s strengths. 
Welfare Theory 
Welfare theory grows from Bentham‟s ideas on Utilitarianism. 
Radin tracks how this wealth maximization approach leads to 
economic analysis. The law and economics movement, powerfully 
at the center of American legal thought for the last four decades, 
brings logic to this calculation. Great thinkers like Judge Richard 
Posner have seized on economic theory as the road to wealth 
maximization in society. Economic analysis also introduces 
mathematical precision into legal theory. Since the days of Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo‟s monumental book, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process, American judges have puzzled over how to concretize 
common law norms and judicial interpretation of statutory 
language. The porousness at the edge of judicial analysis led to the 
growth of legal realism and its descendants. Economic theory 
provided balm to the troubled theorists. Equations are strong 
building blocks. Numbers work. 
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Some members of the law and economics community have reacted 
negatively to Radin. Rather than subscribing to the importance of 
consent as the root of contract, such thinkers place emphasis on the 
operation of the market. If allowed to function without 
interference, things will work out. To explain Radin‟s central 
problem of uninformed consent in form contracts, the welfare camp 
has a response. They contend that consumers happily trade an 
autonomous role in contracting for the cheaper price of goods that 
should result when a vendor uses boilerplate contracts. There is no 
empirical work to resolve the question of whether the typical 
consumer would give up his legal rights under contract law in 
order to pay a reduced price for a good.  Indeed the design of such 
a study escapes me. But the point is powerful and the forces of law 
and economics are strong. Rather than rehearsing here the 
extended line of arguments on this topic here, a better suggestion is 
to provide a citation to Professor Kim‟s excellent summary in the 
Green Bag. It is a readable survey of the contested area.10 
Radin has long looked beyond the bottom line numbers in 
transactions. Her breakthrough article on non commodification of 
goods for sale was an early shot across the bow in a battle that she 
has fought for decades. One could posit that she stands as the 
major theoretical exponent for human dignity over profit. 
Reliance Theory 
The growth of Reliance theory in U.S. Contract Law has been 
dramatic. Consideration theory had emerged as the center of U. S. 
contract law. Indeed it came to symbolize the formalist school of 
jurisprudence. But the doctrine was too difficult to employ in all 
cases. In a manner that Cardozo would characterize as glacial, the 
courts found ways around it. The relied upon promise emerged. 
Since the introduction of Section 90 into the first Restatement of 
Contracts, contractual liability may be premised upon the 
detrimental reliance of one party on the promise of another. The 
saga of Reliance is a long one but, to use one of my favorite 
metaphors, it is a cake that has been baked. The twists and turns of 
                                                          
10  Nancy S. Kim, Boilerplate and Consent, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 293 (2013) 
available at http://www.greenbag.org/v17n3/v17n3_articles_kim.pdf. 
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theoretical evolution and justification are complete. Reliance theory 
has been incorporated into modern U.S. law. The span of time it 
took to resolve the issue was a long one and the steps in the process 
never simple, but the job was done. Perhaps it can serve as a model 
for the growth of Boilerplate theory. 
Aristotelean Theory 
Building on the work of Professor James Gordley and others, Radin 
sketches a morality based theory. Rehearsing the work of Professor 
Fried on promises and the power that they inherently carry, she 
lays out this appealing theory. Fairness and honesty are noble in 
constructing a theory. The theory is limited by the extent of the 
human conscience. If men were angels it could govern transactions 
successfully. But Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.‟s famous observation 
that Contract Law is designed for the „bad man‟ cannot be 
dismissed. Relying on the best intentions of human beings is an 
enterprise that is doomed from the start. Nor would the anti-
authoritarian legal principles that underpin the U.S. Constitution 
and its legal progeny accept allowing a court to govern transactions 
by judging the justice of each deal. Better to trust the individuals 
involved in the deal than to put it into the hands of a governmental 
entity. 
Conclusion 
Radin‟s Boilerplate is a great read for anyone interested in contract 
law in the United States in 2014.She lays out the topography of 
contract law with great skill and insight. The second half of the 
book concerns her prescriptions for solving the dilemmas posed by 
boilerplate and modern contracting. Her reliance on governmental 
schemes to insure equity are problematic though intriguing.  I will 
not critique them here. Whether one agrees with them or not, the 
first half of the book is a terrific primer on contracts. After reading 
it, anyone will be up to speed on the problems and uncertainties of 
today. 
 
 
